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Optional Arbitration Clause
for Use in US-USSR Trade:
16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 444 (1977).
After four years of negotiations, the Optional Arbitration Clause
for Use in U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade became effective on January 12, 1977
upon an exchange of letters between the American Arbitration Associ-
ation [AAA] and the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
The Clause is designed for use in contracts between legal or natural
persons of the United States and foreign trade organizations of the
Soviet Union. Although parties of both countries may use any arbitra-
tion clause that they prefer, it is assumed that this particular clause will
be promoted extensively by each organization. In addition, the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce has agreed to perform administrative functions in
connection with arbitration proceedings.
One of the most important aspects of the Clause is the change of
the arbitration forum to Stockholm from Moscow. This prevents arbi-
tration in Moscow before the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of
the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which had tradi-
tionally been indicated in Soviet standard-form contracts as the forum for
arbitration.' The absence of Moscow leverage lessens Soviet bargaining
power and also removes a major obstacle to trade.
Another key element of the Clause is its reliance on the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL] Arbi-
tration Rules 2 in the actual arbitration proceecd'-gs. Whereas previous
arbitration rules, such as the Arbitration Rul of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe 3 and the Rules for International
Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations Economic Commission
for Asia and the Far East, 4 were regional in use, the UNCITRAL, rules
are designed for world-wide application. The Clause is thus the first
recognition of universal arbitration rules which are designed to facilitate
international trade.
The major omission in the Clause appears within its process of
selecting arbitrators. The Clause provides that arbitration will be con-
ducted by three arbitrators. One is appointed by each party. However,
if within fifteen days after receipt of the claimant's- notification of
appointment of an arbitrator, the respondent has not notified the
claimant of the appointment of its arbitrator, the second arbitrator may
then be appointed by the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try or the AAA, depending on the respondent's nationality. If these
'Note, The Case for FTAC Arbitration of Disputes Between Soviet Enterprises and
American Firms, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 302 (1975).2The text of these rules is found in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 701 (1976).
3U.N. Doc. E/ECE/625/Rev. 1 (1966); U.N. Doc. E/ECE/TRADE/81/Rev. 1 (1966).
4The text of these rules appears in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
DOCUMENTS 161 (C. Schmitthoff, ed. 1975).
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bodies do not notify the claimant of a choice within fifteen days of
the claimant's request, the selection is made by the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce.
At this point, the two appointed arbitrators choose the third
arbitrator. If no agreement is reached within thirty days of the ap-
pointment of the second arbitrator, then the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce makes the selection. The procedure consists of submitting
to both parties identical lists of the then existing joint panel of presid-
ing arbitrators established by the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and
Industry and the AAA. Each party deletes the names to which it
objects (but no more than one-half of the names), and the Stockholm
Chamber makes the final appointment from the remaining names.
Thus, there is simply no provision which requires prospective arbitrators
to possess specific qualifications, especially when the decision is left to the
Stockholm Chamber.
Although commercial law will govern much of the arbitration,
industrial cooperation transactions constitute a large portion of East-
West trade. A key inquiry is whether standard arbitration procedures
and remedies of commercial law, designed for simple property dis-
putes, should be applied to the more complex industrial cooperation
transactions. Each party desires a practical resolution which best meets
its needs. In disputes involving the construction of plants, the Soviet
recipient desires specific performance rather than compensation, and
the United States contractor wishes to complete performance in order
to avoid high penalty damages.- Thus, the critical issues of industrial
cooperation contracts are not damages, but workmanship and rate of
delay in performance. These issues should be arbitrated by technical
experts. On the other hand, in transactions involving both industrial
performance and export of goods, the arbitrators should also possess
sufficient legal training to settle questions of commercial law.6 The major
weakness in the Clause is its failure to provide that certain disputes
should be decided by arbitrators with the reauisite skill.
The confidence placed in the Stockholm Chamber to select qual-
ified arbitrators may be well-founded, but the Clause allows each party
to reject unwanted arbitrators. It may be expecting too much to
presume that these objections will be made on purely business, and
not political, grounds. Thus, while the Clause is a giant step forward in
strengthening East-West trade and encouraging a favorable world
arbitration climate, it will take practical application of the Clause to
inspire a set of U.S.-U.S.S.R. arbitration rules which provide for the
selection of arbitrators with the requisite qualifications to handle a
specific dispute.
E. M.
5The Case for FTAC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 310.61d. at 312. 1
